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Abstract
This is a mostly philosophical discussion of approaches to statistical hypoth-
esis testing, including p-values, classical frequentist testing, Bayesian testing,
and conditional frequentist testing. We also briey discuss the issue of multi-
plicity, an issue of increasing concern in discovery. The article concludes with
some musings concerning what it means to be a frequentist.
1 Introduction
Because of the tradition in high-energy physics of requiring overwhelming evidence before stating a
discovery, there has been limited attention paid to formal statistical testing. With the increasing cost
of data, and issues involving simultaneous performance of a multitude of tests, there is likely to be
an increasing interest in more formal testing. The main purpose of this article is to review the major
approaches to testing, utilizing the basic high-energy physics problem as the vehicle for the discussion.
The following are some of the conclusions that will be argued:
 Tests are very different creatures than condence intervals or condence bounds, and it is often
not correct to conclude an hypothesis is wrong because it lies outside a condence interval.
 p-values are typically much smaller than actual error probabilities.
 Objective Bayesian and (good) frequentist error probabilities can agree, providing simultaneous
frequentist performance with conditional Bayesian guarantees.
There will also be a brief discussion of multiplicity in testing in Section 3, highlighting the
Bayesian approach to dealing with the problem. Section 4 contains some musings about the meaning
of frequentism, motivated by presentations and discussions at the Phystat 07 conference.
2 Hypothesis testing
We review, and critically examine, p-values, classical frequentist testing, Bayesian testing and condi-
tional frequentist testing. An ongoing example used in the discussion is a high-energy physics example
described in the next section. For pedagogical reasons, a very stylized version of the problem will be
considered here, ignoring most of the real physics.
2.1 The pedagogical testing problem and statistical model
Suppose the data, X , is the number of events observed in time T that are characteristic of Higgs boson
production in an LHC particle collision experiment. The probabilistic model for the data is that X has
density




where θ is the mean rate of production of Higgs events in time T in the experiment and b is the (assumed
known) mean rate of production of events from background sources in time T . Two specic values of X
and b that we will follow through various analyses are
Case 1: x = 7 and b = 1.2; Case 2: x = 6 and b = 2.2.
The main purpose of the experiment is supposedly to determine whether or not the Higgs boson
exists which, in terms of the probability model for the data, is typically phrased as testing H0 : θ = 0
8
versus H1 : θ > 0. Thus H0 corresponds to ‘no Higgs.’ (Later we will discuss the issue of whether this
statistical test is the correct representation of the desired scientic test.) There are many secondary issues
that are of interest, such as What is a lower condence bound for the mass of the Higgs? We will not
discuss this issue in depth (noting that it has been the focus of many of the Phystat conferences), but will
contrast the statistical analysis of the issue with the basic existence issue answered by the test.
2.2 Classical statistical analysis
There are two types of classical analysis: use of p-values, as recommended by Fisher [1], and use of
xed error probability tests, as recommended by Neyman [2].
2.2.1 p-values
The p-value in this example, corresponding to observed data x, is
p = P (X ≥ x | b, θ = 0) =
∞∑
m=x
Poisson(m | 0 + b) .
This is the probability, under the null hypothesis, of observing data as or more extreme than the actual
experimental data, and the tradition is to reject the null hypothesis if p is small enough. The part of
the denition that may seem odd is the inclusion of more extreme data in the probability computation.
Indeed, the oddity of doing so led to Jeffreys’s [3] famous criticism of p-values ... a hypothesis that
may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted observable results that have not occurred. (It
is worth spending the time to understand that sentence.) For the two cases,
Case 1: p = 0.00025 if x = 7 and b = 1.2; Case 2: p = 0.025 if x = 6 and b = 2.2.
There is general agreement that a small p-value indicates that something unusual has happened, but
that the p-value does not have a direct quantitative interpretation as evidence against the null hypothesis.
Thus Luc Demortier observed in his talk at the Phystat 07 conference:
In any search for new physics, a small p-value should only be seen as a rst step in the inter-
pretation of the data, to be followed by a serious investigation of an alternative hypothesis.
Only by showing that the latter provides a better explanation of the observations than the
null hypothesis can one make a convincing case for discovery.
2.2.2 Fixed α-level testing
Under this approach, one pre-species the set of data for which one would reject the hypothesis  the
rejection region  selecting the set so that the probability of rejection under the null hypothesis is the
desired error probability α. Often, as in our example, one can formally state the rejection region in terms
of the p-value, namely reject if p ≤ α. Because X has a discrete distribution in our example, α should
be limited to the possible values allowed by this discreteness; otherwise, one would have to articially
introduce some randomization which is unappealing. (That this rejection region indeed has probability
α at the allowed values, follows from an easy computation.)
There are two major concerns with using xed error probability testing. The rst is that it does
not properly seem to reect the evidence in the data. For instance, suppose one pre-selected α = 0.001.
This then is the error one must report whether p = 0.001 or p = 0.000001, in spite of the fact that the
latter would seem to provide much stronger evidence against the null hypothesis.
The second concern, as it applies to typical high-energy physics experiments, is more subtle:
data naturally arrives, and is analyzed, sequentially and typical frequentist computations of xed error
probabilities must take this into account. For instance, suppose the experimental plan is to review the
accumulated data at the end of each month, with there being a possibility of claiming a discovery at each
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review. The rejection region is then a complicated set involving possible rejection at each of the time
points (together with a lack of previous rejection); the frequentist error probability is the probability of
this complicated rejection region and is typically much larger than the probability of the rejection region
at a particular time. To achieve an error probability of α = 0.001 for instance, the rejection region might
have to be something such as reject at each review if p ≤ 0.0001, so that the frequent looks at the
data require a higher standard of evidence to achieve the desired error probability. Note that p-values
are affected by this same issue and in roughly the same way: much smaller p-values are needed in a
sequential experiment to convey the same evidence as in a xed sample size experiment.
Louis Lyons raised the interesting point that, with the LHC, declaration of a discovery would not
stop the data gathering process, as is common in sequential experimentation in, say, clinical trials. (In
clinical trials, claim of a discovery would ethically necessitate stopping the trial, in an attempt to save
lives while, as Louis points out, no one we know of really cares if a few more particles are smashed.) So,
in principle, a mistake made by this ‘sequential look-elsewhere effect’ could be corrected with later data.
In practice, however, declaration of a discovery often does have other effects  e.g., people stop
research along lines that are incompatible with the discovery  so there is a serious cost to erroneous
claims of discovery (in addition to having to return the Nobel prizes), even if there is a possibility of later
correction. Also, we shall see that there are readily available reports (both Bayesian and frequentist) that
can be made on an interim basis and which do not have difculty with this sequential look-elsewhere
effect, so the entire philosophical conundrum can be avoided.
2.3 Bayesian testing
2.3.1 Bayes factor
The Bayes factor of H0 to H1 in our ongoing example is given by
B01(x) =
Poisson(x | 0 + b)∫∞
0 Poisson(x | θ + b)pi(θ) dθ
=
bx e−b∫∞
0 (θ + b)
x e−(θ+b)pi(θ) dθ
;
in the subjective Bayesian approach, the prior density, pi(θ), is chosen to reect the beliefs of the investi-
gators (e.g., it could reect the standard model predictions pertaining to the Higgs) while, in the objective
Bayesian approach, it is chosen conventionally and nominally reects a lack of knowledge concerning
θ.
A reasonable objective prior here (to be justied later, but note that it is a proper prior) is pi I(θ) =
b(θ + b)−2. For this prior, the Bayes factor is given by
B01 =
bx e−b∫∞
0 (θ + b)
x e−(θ+b)b(θ + b)−2 dθ
=
b(x−1) e−b
Γ(x− 1, b) ,
where Γ is the incomplete gamma function. The result for the two cases is
Case 1: B01 = 0.0075 (recall p = 0.00025); Case 2: B01 = 0.26 (recall p = 0.025)
2.3.2 Objective posterior probabilities of the hypotheses
The objective choice of prior probabilities of the hypotheses is Pr(H0) = Pr(H1) = 0.5, in which case
Pr(H0 | x) = B011 + B01 .
For the two cases in the example,
Case 1: Pr(H0 | x) = 0.0075 (recall p = 0.00025); Case 2: Pr(H0 | x) = 0.21 (recall p = 0.025).
Of course, one can specify subjective prior probabilities of each hypothesis and determine the
resulting posterior probabilities, but scientic communication is usually done through objective poste-
rior probabilities or Bayes factors, since any individual can take either and easily convert it into the
individual’s personal subjective answer.
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2.3.3 Complete posterior distribution
In addition to the uncertainty in the hypotheses, there is also uncertainty in θ, given that H1 were true.
The complete posterior distribution is thus determined by
 Pr(H0 | x), the posterior probability of the null hypothesis;
 pi(θ | x,H1), the posterior distribution of θ under H1.
For Case 1 in the example, Figure 1 presents these two parts of the full posterior distribution. One way
of thinking of this is that the vertical bar gives the probability that one has just observed noise, while the
density part says where θ is likely to be if there is a discovery.












Fig. 1: For Case 1, Pr(H0 | x) (the vertical bar), and the posterior density for θ given x = 7 and H1.
A useful summary of the complete posterior is Pr(H0 | x) and C , a (say) 95% posterior condence
interval for θ under H1. For the two cases, and with C chosen to be an equal-tailed 95% posterior
condence interval (i.e., omitting 2.5% of the posterior mass on the left and the right)
Case 1: Pr(H0 | x) = 0.0075 and C = (1.0, 10.5); Case 2: Pr(H0 | x) = 0.21 and C = (0.2, 8.2).
C could, alternatively, be chosen to be a one-sided condence bound, if desired.
Note that condence intervals alone are not a satisfactory inferential summary. In Case 2, for
instance, the 95% condence interval does not include 0, and so many mistakenly believe that one can
accordingly reject H0 : θ = 0. But, the full posterior distribution also has a probability of 0.21 that
θ = 0, which would hardly imply a condent rejection.
A Brief Aside: A precise null hypothesis, such as H0 : θ = 0, is typically never true exactly; rather, it
is used as a surrogate for a ‘real null’ H ²0 : θ < ², ² small. In the Higgs example for instance, while
the scientic null is real (i.e., the Higgs might not exist), the statistical null is based on the experimental
measurements, and there is undoubtedly some small bias ² in the experiment. Berger and Delampady [4]
show that, under reasonable conditions, if ² < 14 σθˆ, where σθˆ is the standard error of the estimate of θ,
then Pr(H²0|x) ≈ Pr(H0|x) , so that the point null is then a reasonable approximation to the real null.
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2.4 The discrepancy between p-values and posterior probabilities
The Bayesian error probabilities given in the previous section differed from the corresponding p-values
by factors of 30 and 10 in the two cases, respectively. What explains this?
It might be tempting to say that there is something wrong with the Bayesian analysis, but even a
pure likelihood analysis (favored by many Fisherians) reveals the same effect. In particular (following
Edwards, Lindeman and Savage [10]), note that a lower bound on the Bayes factor over all possible priors
can be found by choosing pi(θ) to be a point mass at θˆ (the maximum likelihood estimate), yielding
B01(x) =
Poisson(x | 0 + b)∫∞
0 Poisson(x | θ + b)pi(θ) dθ
≥ Poisson(x | 0 + b)






In ‘likelihood language,’ this says that, for the given data, the likelihood of H0 relative to the likelihood
of H1 is at least the bound on the right hand side of (1). For the two cases, this bound is
Case 1: B01 ≥ 0.0014 (recall p = 0.00025); Case 2: B01 ≥ 0.11 (recall p = 0.025),
so that a serious discrepancy remains even when the prior is eliminated. This can be traced to the fact
that the p-value is based on the probability of the tail area of the distribution, rather than the probability
of the actual observed data.
It is well known that Bayesian analysis utilizing suitable proper priors will automatically penalize
more complex models (i.e., has an Ockham’s razor effect  cf. Jefferys and Berger [5]), and it is useful to
separate this effect from that observed above in explaining the difference between p-values and posterior
probabilities or Bayes factors. Thus in Case 1, where the p-value (≈ .00025) and the objective posterior
probability of the null (≈ 0.0075) differ by a factor of 30,
 a factor of .0014/.00025 ≈ 5.6 is due to the difference between a tail area {X : X ≥ 7} and the
actual observation X = 7 (as reected through the likelihood ratio for the observation);
 the remaining factor of roughly 5.4 in favor of the null results from the Ockham’s razor penalty
resulting from the conventional proper prior that was used.
An Aside – Robust Bayesian Analysis: Robust Bayesian theory (cf. Berger [6] for references) takes a
more sophisticated look at the type of bounding over priors that is done in (1). For instance, it might be
deemed scientically reasonable to restrict attention to priors pi(θ) that are nonincreasing, in which case





0 (θ + b)
x e−(θ+b)c−1 dθ
.
For the two cases, this bound is
Case 1: B01 ≥ 0.0024 (recall p = 0.00025); Case 2: B01 ≥ 0.15 (recall p = 0.025).
2.5 Conditional frequentist testing
There is a powerful (but, alas, largely overlooked) frequentist school called conditional frequentist anal-
ysis. This school was formalized by Kiefer [7] and Brown [8], and proceeds as follows:
 nd a statistic S that reects the strength of evidence in the data;
 compute the frequentist measure of error conditional on S.
Artificial example (from Berger and Wolpert [9]): Observe X1 and X2 where
Xi =
{
θ + 1 with probability 1/2
θ − 1 with probability 1/2.




2(X1 + X2) if X1 6= X2
X1 − 1 if X1 = X2 ;
J. BERGER
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it is easy to compute that Pθ(C(X1, X2) contains θ) = 0.75. It is, however, clearly silly to report this;
when X1 6= X2, it is a certainty that the condence set equals θ while, if X1 = X2, it is intuitively
50-50 as to whether the condence set equals θ. The issue here is typically phrased in statistics as that of
desiring good conditional performance (for relevant subsets of the actual data); in the Phystat literature it
is more commonly phrased as desiring Bayesian credibility: for a reasonable prior, the Bayesian coverage
of the condence set should be reasonable. In this example, for instance, if one uses the objective prior
pi(θ) = 1, then C(X1, X2) has Bayesian credibility of 100% if x1 6= x2 and 50% if x1 = x2, so that
the report of 75% condence in all circumstances would be seriously decient from the viewpoint of
Bayesian credibility.
The conditional frequentist approach here would
 measure the strength of evidence in the data by, say, S = |X1 −X2| (either 0 or 2)
 compute the conditional coverage
Pθ(C(X1, X2) contains θ | S) =
{
0.5 if S = 0
1.0 if S = 2 ,
which is clearly the right answer.
Returning to the testing problem, Berger, Brown and Wolpert [11] for continuous data, and Dass
[12] for discrete data, proposed the following conditional frequentist testing procedure for testing a sim-
ple hypothesis versus a simple alternative:
 Develop S, the measure of strength of evidence in the data, as follows:
 let pi(x) be the p-value from testing Hi against the other hypothesis;
 dene S = max{p0(x), p1(x)}; its use is based on deciding that data (in either the rejection
or acceptance regions) with the same p-value has the same ‘strength of evidence.’
 Accept H0 when p0 > p1, and reject otherwise.
 Compute Type I and Type II conditional error probabilities as
α(s) = P0(rejecting H0 | S = s) ≡ P0(p0 ≤ p1 | S(X) = s)
β(s) = P1(accepting H0 | S = s) ≡ P1(p0 > p1 | S(X) = s),
where Pi refers to probability under Hi.
The surprising feature of this conditional test is stated in the following theorem from those papers.
Theorem 1 The conditional frequentist error probabilities, α(s) and β(s), exactly equal the (objective)
posterior probabilities of H0 and H1, so conditional frequentists and Bayesians report the same error
probabilities.
In our ongoing example, the conditional Type I error is thus α(s) = Pr(H0 | x) = B01/(1 + B01)
(=0.0075 in Case 1; =0.21 in Case 2). Some features of this:
 The conditional test can be viewed as a way to convert p-values into real frequentist error proba-
bilities when there is an alternative hypothesis.
 The conditional error probabilities α(s) and β(s) are fully data-dependent (being smaller when p
is smaller, in contrast to the xed α-level tests), yet are fully frequentist.
 The conditional test also applies without any change in sequential settings; since Bayesian error
probabilities are known to ignore the stopping rule, so must the conditional frequentist test (Berger,
Boukai and Wang [13]).
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The conditional frequentist test thus overcomes all of the difculties with the xed α-level test that were
discussed earlier, and so can be used happily by frequentists. Of course, one need not go through the
formal conditional frequentist computation, since the theorem guarantees that the answer which would
be obtained is the same as the objective Bayesian answer (which can be obtained much more directly).
There is the caveat that the above discussion was given only for the testing of two simple hypothe-
ses. In our ongoing example, on the other hand, H1 was a composite hypothesis (involving an unknown
θ). The papers mentioned above do cover the extension of the theory to the composite alternative case,
with the only modication being that the conditional Type II error that is obtained is a certain average
Type II error over θ; the conditional Type I error is unaffected. Extensions to composite null hypotheses
are considered in Dass and Berger [14] for composite null hypotheses that have an invariance structure
to group operations; this class of composite null hypotheses includes most classical situations of testing.
The nice feature of this class of composite null hypotheses is that the conditional Type I error is constant
over the null hypothesis, and so no averaging over Type I error needs to be done. (There are other tech-
nical caveats to the conditional frequentist testing paradigm that are discussed in the mentioned papers,
but they have essentially no practical impact.)
2.6 Implementing Bayesian testing
To implement objective Bayesian estimation (and condence procedures) there are, in principle, excellent
objective priors available, such as reference priors (see Bernardo [15] for a review and references). In
practice, determination of such objective priors can be challenging but the goal is, at least, clear.
In Bayesian hypothesis testing and model selection, however, determination of suitable prior dis-
tributions is considerably more challenging, in part because it is typically the case that improper prior
distributions cannot be used (or at least have to be used very carefully). Use of ‘vague proper priors’
(another staple of many Bayesians in estimation problems) is even worse, and will typically give non-
sensical answers in testing and model selection. There has thus been a huge effort in statistics to derive
objective (or at least conventional) priors for use in hypothesis testing and model selection. These issues
and this literature can be accessed through Berger and Pericchi [16].
For our ongoing example, an appealing methodology for default prior construction is the intrinsic
or expected posterior prior construction. For the situation where the data consists of i.i.d. observations
from a density f(x | θ), and for testing H0 : θ = θ0 versus H1 : θ 6= θ0, the construction is as follows:
 let piO(θ) be a good estimation objective prior, so that piO(θ | x) = [∏ni=1 f(xi | θ)]piO(θ)/mO(x)




i=1 f(xi | θ)]piO(θ) dθ;
 then the intrinsic prior is piI(θ) =
∫
piO(θ | x∗)[∏qi=1 f(xi | θ0)] dx∗, with x∗ = (x1, . . . , xq)
being (unobserved) data of the minimal sample size q such that mO(x∗) < ∞.
Note that this will be a proper (not vague proper) prior.
The idea behind this prior is that, if one were handed the data x∗ but allowed to use it only for
prior construction, one would happily compute piO(θ | x∗) and use this proper prior to conduct the test.
We don’t have x∗ available, but we could simulate x∗ from the null model, and compute the resulting
‘average’ prior. There are many other justications of this prior; see PØrez and Berger [17] for discussion
and references. Note, however, that use of such conventional proper priors is inherently more contentious
than use of objective priors for estimation problems. Indeed, it would be better to determine pi(θ) from
consensus scientic knowledge, providing the knowledge is relatively precise and quantiable.
For our ongoing example, suppose we choose piO(θ) = 1/(θ + b). (Jeffreys prior, the square root
of piO, would probably be better, but leads to a much more difcult computation.) Following the ideas
in Berger and Pericchi [18], we represent the Poisson observation, X , over the time period T from the
distribution in the example as a sum of i.i.d observations from an exponential inter-arrival time process.
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Indeed, for i = 1, . . ., consider Yi ∼ f(yi | (θ + b)/T ) = (θ + b)T−1 exp{−(θ + b)yi/T}; then
X ≡ {rst j such that Sj =
∑j
i=1 Yi > T}−1. A minimal sample size for this exponential distribution
can easily be seen to be q = 1. Computation then yields piI(θ) =
∫
piO(θ | y1)f(y1 | 0)dy1 = b/(θ+b)2,
which was the conventional proper prior used for Bayesian testing in the example.
3 Multiplicities
The issue of dealing with multiplicities in discovery is increasingly being recognized to be important.
One type of multiple testing has already been discussed, namely sequential experimentation in which
one periodically evaluates the incoming data to see if a discovery can be claimed. It is interesting that
frequentist analyses often need to be adjusted to account for these ‘looks at the data,’ while Bayesian
analyses (and optimal conditional frequentist analyses) do not. That Bayesian analysis claims no need to
adjust for this ‘look elsewhere’ effect  called the stopping rule principle  has long been a controversial
and difcult issue in statistics, as admirably expressed by Savage [19]: I learned the stopping rule
principle from Professor Barnard, in conversation in the summer of 1952. Frankly, I then thought it
a scandal that anyone in the profession could advance an idea so patently wrong, even as today I can
scarcely believe that people resist an idea so patently right. See Berger and Berry [20] for discussion of
this controversy, and note that the controversy is no longer a frequentist versus Bayesian issue, because
of the fact that optimal conditional frequentist tests also obey the stopping rule principle.
Another common situation of multiple testing is when one is scanning many possible data sets
for a discovery. For instance, suppose 1000 energy channels are searched for a signal expected from a
non-standard theory. It is well known that one cannot proceed with separate testing of each data set, but
the classical solution  the Bonferonni adjustment  is often viewed as being too harsh. The Bonferonni
adjustment assumes each test is independent, in which case one divides the desired error probability α
by the number of tests to determine the signicance level that an individual test must achieve to declare a
discovery. Thus if α = 0.001 is desired for 1000 independent tests, the per-test signicance level should
be set at 0.000001 for declaring a discovery.
I have been told that the assumption of (at least approximate) independence of test statistics does
hold for many high-energy physics experiments, in which case use of the Bonferonni correction is ne.
When the various test statistics are dependent, however (as happens in most non-physics examples I
know of), the Bonferroni correction can be much too conservative, so it’s use would incur a dramatic
loss of power for discovery. Finding appropriate correction for multiple testing under dependence is,
unfortunately, quite difcult from the frequentist viewpoint. Note, also, that there are no shortcuts here;
simple alternative methods such as the ‘false discovery rate’ are ne for screening purposes, but are not
useful for claiming a discovery.
One of the highly attractive features of the Bayesian approach to multiple testing or model se-
lection is that (if done properly) it will automatically adjust for multiplicities, and do so in a way that
preserves as much discriminatory power as possible. The Bayesian adjustment for multiplicity occurs,
somewhat curiously, directly through the prior probabilities assigned to the tests or models. Consider
two illustrative cases:
Mutually exclusive hypotheses: Suppose one is testing mutually exclusive hypotheses Hi, i = 1, . . . ,m,
where it is known that one is true. An objective Bayesian would choose pi = Pr(Hi) = 1/m. Suppose,
for instance, that a signal is known to exist, but it is not known in which of 1000 energy channels it
will manifest. Then each channel would be assigned prior probability 0.001 of containing the signal, an
automatic penalization of each hypothesis.
Suppose instead that 1000 channels are searched for a signal expected from a non-standard theory
that could manifest in only one channel. Then one should assign some prior mass  e.g. 1/2  to ‘no
signal,’ giving prior probability of 0.0005 to each channel. Note that these simple adjustments apply no
matter what the dependence is between the test statistics, indicating why it is much easier to approach
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multiplicity adjustment from the Bayesian perspective.
Independently occurring hypotheses: Consider, instead, the situation in which there are multiple possible
discoveries, and that the signal from each would appear in a separate channel. If we knew nothing about
these possible signals, we might choose to assign prior probabilities by rst dening p as the probability
that any given channel will manifest a signal. This would typically be unknown, and hence would need
to be assigned a prior distribution pi(p). This could be chosen according to scientic knowledge, or set
equal to a default prior such as the uniform distribution. That an assignment of prior probabilities such
as this automatically deals with multiplicity is demonstrated in Scott and Berger [21].
There is a large and increasing literature on discovery techniques in the face of multiplicity. Two
recent references are Storey, Dai and Leek [22] and Guindani, Zhang and Mueller [23].
4 Musings on the meaning of frequentism
4.1 Introduction and example
During the Phystat meeting, there were a number of interesting problems discussed that caused me to
reect on the meaning of frequentism. To facilitate the discussion here, consider the following version of
the basic HEP problem, but now focusing on condence bounds (see, e.g., Heinrich [24] for background).
Suppose Xs+b ∼ Poisson(Xs+b | s + b), where s is the unknown signal mean and b now an
unknown background mean. The goal is to nd an upper condence limit for s. There is also information
available about the nuisance parameter b, arising from either
 Case 1: independent sideband data Xb ∼ Poisson(Xb | b),
 Case 2: randomness in b from experiment to experiment arising from a known random mechanism,
 Case 3: agreed scientic beliefs.
4.2 Bayesian analysis
Suppose we have an agreed upon objective prior density piO(s | b) for s given b (the best objective priors
will typically depend on nuisance parameters such as b here). The information about b would be encoded
in a prior density pi(b). This density would be derived differently in each case:
 Case 1: With the sideband data Xb, a standard approach would be to chose an initial objective prior
piO(b), and then choose the nal pi(b) to be the posterior piO(b | Xb) ∝ Poisson(Xb | b)piO(b).
 Case 2: pi(b) describes the physical randomness of the (otherwise unmeasured) background from
experiment to experiment.
 Case 3: pi(b) is chosen to encode accepted scientic beliefs.
In all three cases, Bayesian analysis would proceed in the same way, constructing a 100(1 − α)% upper




pi(s | Xs+b) ds ,
where pi(s | Xs+b) is the posterior distribution
pi(s | Xs+b) =
∫
Poisson(Xs+b | s + b)piO(s | b)pi(b) db∫ ∫
Poisson(Xs+b | s + b)piO(s | b)pi(b) db ds
.
The point is that Bayesian analysis does not care about the nature of the randomness in the modeling of




Frequentist analysis can be quite different in the three cases.
4.3.1 Frequentist analysis in Case 1.
The natural frequentist goal: Frequentist coverage with respect to the joint distribution of Xs+b and Xb,
i.e. control of





1{s≤U(Xs+b,Xb)}Poisson(Xs+b | s + b)Poisson(Xb | b) ,
where 1{s≤U(Xs+b,Xb)} is 1 if s ≤ U(Xs+b, Xb) and 0 otherwise.
This problem has been extensively studied in the Phystat literature. It is interesting that there is,
as of yet, no solution which is agreed by all to be adequate in terms of both frequentist coverage and
Bayesian credibility (conditional performance). The objective Bayesian holy grail in this problem would
be to nd the reference prior for (s, b), with s being the parameter of interest; the hope is that the upper
condence bound arising from such a prior would do an excellent job of balancing frequentist coverage
and Bayesian credibility. Finding the reference prior is very challenging, however, as was discussed in
the Phystat talk of Luc Demortier (and see Demortier [25]).
4.3.2 Frequentist analysis in Case 2.
The natural frequentist goal: Frequentist coverage with respect to the marginal density of Xs+b, given
by f(Xs+b | s) =
∫
Poisson(Xs+b | s + b)pi(b)db. The coverage target is then
P (s ≤ U(Xs+b) | s) =
∞∑
Xs+b=0
1{s≤U(Xs+b)}f(Xs+b | s) .
The reason this is the natural frequentist goal is because b changes from experiment to experiment ac-
cording to pi(b), and real frequentism is about performance of a statistical procedure in actual repeated
use of the procedure in differing experiments, as discussed in Neyman [2]. (The textbook denition of
frequentism  in which one considers imaginary repetition of the same experiment  makes no sense
in terms of reality; the standard denition has mathematical relevance, but the philosophical appeal of
frequentism to scientists is presumably its relevance to real experimentation over time.)
Attaining this frequentist goal while achieving good Bayesian credibility is potentially rather
straightforward, since the problem has been reduced to a one-parameter problem. Indeed, one simply
computes the reference (Jeffreys) prior corresponding to f(Xs+b | s), namely
piJ(s) =
√
I(s) , I(s) = −
∞∑
Xs+b=0
f(Xs+b | s) d
2
ds2
log f(Xs+b | s) .
The resulting Bayesian condence bound will automatically have good Bayesian credibility (conditional
performance), and the Jeffreys prior for one-parameter problems typically results in Bayes procedures
with excellent frequentist coverage properties (except possibly at the boundary s = 0; see Bayarri and
Berger [26] for discussion).
4.3.3 Frequentist analysis in Case 3.
The natural frequentist goal: Here the situation is quite murky. Since pi(b) is not physical randomness,
but simply scientic opinion, a classical frequentist could insist that, for every given s and b, we control
P (s ≤ U(Xs+b) | s, b) =
∞∑
Xs+b=0
1{s≤U(Xs+b)}Poisson(Xs+b | s + b) .
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This is actually not possible to control unless there is a known bound on b, but a classical frequentist
would philosophically wish to control this coverage.
Alternatively, one could argue that, since pi(b) arises from consensus scientic opinion, it should
be treated the same as when it arises from physical randomness, and so one should seek to control
coverage as in Case 2, i.e.






P (s ≤ U(Xs+b) | s, b)pi(b)db .
The second expression for this coverage shows that the criterion can be interpreted as an average of the
coverage for given s and b, averaged over the consensus prior distribution for b.
There are many situations in which it has been argued that a frequentist should use an average
coverage criterion; see Bayarri and Berger [26] for examples and references. Here it seems clearly right
because of necessity; what else can be done given the available information? The point worth pondering
is  if average coverage is ne here, why should it be philosophically problematical in other cases?
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